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Despite the heated rhetoric on both sides of the debate about crime
control, there is a surprising dearth of research regarding serious adoles-
cent crime and the courts' prosecution of "mature" delinquents, those
beyond the rehabilitative capabilities of juvenile court. This article re-
ports a large Northeastern city's response to violent crime committed by
its young. All juveniles arrested in one year under the charge of homi-
cide were included in this study to investigate characteristics of their
crime and the dispositional choices made by Philadelphia's Family
Court concerning where these juveniles should be tried. The study pays
particular attention to two critical points in the processing of juveniles
arrested for serious assaultive behavior: waiver to criminal court and
the criminal court trial.' The inclusion of a sample of adult defendants
also charged with homicide allows for a comparison of sentence severity
among three offender groups all charged with similar types of killing,
but tried under different jurisdictions: juveniles in juvenile court,
juveniles in criminal court (certified juveniles), and adults in criminal
court.
2
* Prepared under Grant No. 76 NI-99-0008 from the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice.
Points of view or opinions stated in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Franklin and Marshall College; Ph.D.
Sociology, 1977, M.A. Criminology, 1972, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. Sociology, 1969,
Ohio University. The author wishes to thank Professor Franklin Zimring for his comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Like her sister states, Pennsylvania has a separate juvenile court (the Family Court)
charged with adjudicating the state's offenders under age eighteen. Any youth 14 or over can
be transferred (waived) to criminal court if the Family Court determines that the youth is
"not amenable to rehabilitation," and that the youth's action constitutes a criminal offense.
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 50-101 (Purdon) replacedby 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6302, 6355
(Purdon 1976).
2 It should be stressed that this is a narrative of a process which, until recently, has re-
ceived almost no attention by either the sociological or legal community. Hence, there is no
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This research originated in an earlier study of the determinants of
homicide sentencing in Philadelphia.3 Of all juveniles arrested in the
first 200 homicide events in 1970, exactly half were retained by juvenile
court while the other half were transferred to criminal court to be tried
as adults. Such an even split is compelling both sociologically and in
terms of jurisprudence. A cohort of juveniles, all arrested for the same
type of crime-homicide-is parceled out into two justice systems with
vastly different capacities to punish. This study investigates how such a
selection process is made, how the two groups of juveniles differ from
one another, and what consequences accrue from the sorting process.
This narrative of the waiver process and the subsequent impact of
the decision to transfer jurisdiction will be presented in three parts. The
first part outlines the method of study. This is followed by an analysis of
how the Family Court sifts through juvenile homicide events, selecting
some youths for transfer to criminal court and retaining custody over
the remainder for adjudication as juveniles. The third section compares
the conviction rates and sentence severity of juveniles and adults tried in
adult court for similar types of homicide.
II. METHODS AND SAMPLE
The aim of this study was to gather data on juveniles arrested in
homicides reported to the police in one year, to follow these cases
through the detection, adjudication, and punishment process, and to in-
vestigate the process and impact of transfer decisions.4 The police inves-
existing theory of prosecutorial decision-making with which to analyze the movement of
juveniles through the transfer process. Such a theoretical framework can only be sketched out
after one learns how the court presently functions.
3 Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, .Pwnishing Homidde in Philadelphia, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 227
(1976).
4 At the time of this study, Family Court's jurisdiction included juveniles arrested in
homicide offenses. A 1972 revision excludes juveniles charged with murder or for summary
offenses. Juveniles may be waived to criminal court if the following conditions are met:
(1) the youth is at least 14 at the time of the alleged offense; (2) the offense constitutes a
criminal offense; and (3) the juvenile court finds that a prima facie case has been established.
In the event that the youth is charged with murder, initial processing takes place in criminal
court but the juvenile may be remanded to Family Court should he be found to be "really a
juvenile." This constitutes a "Section Seven Transfer."
The current practice of excluding murder defendants from juvenile court jurisdiction
officially went into effect in 1972. Before this change, all juveniles were processed initially by
Family Court. Because data to be presented in this article are confined to 1970 homicide
arrests, one might question whether it is possible to explain current court functioning with
pre-1972 data. A review of the court's recent history, however, indicates that the Section
Seven Transfer is actually a codification of previous procedure. Before 1972, when juvenile
court retained original jurisdiction in homicide, the District Attorney's office appears to have
selected juveniles for criminal prosecution in an ad hoc form of certification, and the waiver
hearing seems to have been little more than a formality. Currently, in a criminal proceeding
charging murder, if the court finds the defendant to be a child, the case may be transferred to
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tigative report of the homicide event constituted the actual baseline
description. These reports provided data on the type of interaction
preceeding the killing, choice of weapon, and demographic characteris-
tics of victim and offender. Information found in the police records was
supplemented with trial and dispositional data obtained at City Hall
and in Philadelphia's Family Court.5
The sample consists of 63 separate offenses in which 154 youths
were arrested. Almost three-quarters of the victims and over 90 percent
of the offenders were black. As in previous studies, 6 homicide continues
to be an interracial event with 76 percent of the juvenile homicides tak-
ing place between individuals of the same race. When racial lines were
crossed, whites were far more likely to be the victims.
A portion of this research was the subject of an earlier study which
investigated sentencing determinants in the prosecution of the first 200
juvenile court. (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 50-101 replacedby 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6322
(Purdon 1976). See Commonwealth v. Pyke, 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Barbier, 418 A.2d 653 (1980).
5 There are several ways that one could obtain a sample of all juveniles charged and
adjudicated for homicide in any one year. One method is simply to record each name listed
in the investigation reports filed by the police. Name and age of each offender can then be
used to enumerate the universe of defendants and later to determine whether the defendant
was tried at Juvenile Court or City Hall. The District Attorney's office in each jurisdiction
keeps these dispositional data. Alternatively, one could start at Family Court, using the
homicide data files which list each homicide event individually. These files include all youths
referred to juvenile authorities regardless of their eventual transfer to criminal court. The
disadvantage of this second method is that some juveniles could "fall out" of the system
before arriving at Family Court. This attrition is highly unlikely, however, because of the
severity of the offense and the desire by the police to retain all possible co-defendants for the
purpose of giving evidence against the principal assailant.
Both methods were used to identify the sample for this study. The first two-thirds of the
sample consists ofjuveniles included in an earlier study which investigated the first 200 homi-
cide events in Philadelphia in 1970. See Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 3. This
research revealed all juveniles arrested for the killings and also the breakdown of "certified-
not certified." Because these cases were identified in the original police reports and followed
to both juvenile court and criminal court, it is unlikely that any juveniles associated with the
first 200 homicides escaped inclusion in the sample. The District Attorney's files in juvenile
court were used to identify the remainder of the juveniles arrested and prosecuted for homi-
cides in 1970. These offenders were then traced to the police station's homicide report folders
to obtain offense descriptions. This procedure was chosen for several reasons. First, a com-
parison of police reports and juvenile court listings in the original study showed the latter to
be not only a reliable listing of the universe of juveniles named in the original police reports,
but also provided information on several additional youths not named in the investigation
reports. Further, identifying the remaining juveniles would have entailed an investigation of
all the subsequent homicide reports for the year after the 200th-plus event which would have
likely totaled another 225-250 folders. Therefore, for purposes of expediency and with reason-
able assurance that few, if any, juveniles would be lost by using the District Attorney's files,
this method was selected.
6 See L. CURTIS, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE (1974); Block & Zimring, Homicide in Chicago 1965-
70, 10 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1 (1973).
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homicides in Philadelphia in 1970. 7 Adult offenders in that study have
been used to augment the scope of the present research by comparing
their conviction and sentencing risks with those of certified juveniles.
The adult subsample permits a comparison of offense characteristics of
the juvenile and adult homicides, characteristics which might aggravate
the statutory gravity of the offense and lead to sentencing differentials
between convicted offenders, both adult and juvenile.
TABLE 1
PRECIPITATING FACTOR TO HOMICIDE FOR JUVENILE AND
ADULT OFFENSES
PRECIPITATING FACTOR JUVENILES ADULTS
Percent Percent
Robbery 27% 12%




N = 63 130
At the level of offense-description, the adult sample presents several
interesting points of comparison with the juvenile group. The data
presented in Table 1 indicate a higher incidence of robbery-related kill-
ings in the juvenile sample (27 percent) compared with the adult of-
fender group (12 percent). The percentage of robbery associated
homicides in the adult sample is close to that found in earlier reports on
criminal homicide. 8 The juveniles' greater involvement in robbery kill-
ings appears to anticipate the subsequently reported rise in robbery-re-
lated homicide. For example, in 1974, four years after these data were
recorded, Richard Block found robbery homicide to constitute 22 per-
cent of Chicago's homicide total.9
The higher incidence in robbery killings in the juvenile sample is
also reflected in patterns of victim-offender relationship. Juvenile of-
fenders and their victims were strangers in 43 percent of the cases while
the comparable figure for homicides perpetrated by adults was 22 per-
cent. Again, only the adult sample's percentage is consistent with previ-
ous findings concerning victim-offender relationships in violent crime.' 0
17 See Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 3.
8 See R. BLOCK, VIOLENT CRIME (1977); Block & Zimring, supra note 6.
9 R. BLOCK, supra note 8.
10 Munford, Kazer, Feldman & Stivers, Homicide Trends in Atlanta, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 213
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III. CERTIFICATION IN FAMILY COURT
In 1970, 154 juveniles were arrested in 63 police-designated homi-
cides and passed through a sorting process in juvenile court. Of this
total, Family Court retained jurisdiction over 79, or 51 percent, and
transferred (or certified) the remaining 76 to criminal court. This split-
ting of a group of offenders all arrested for the same type of crime sug-
gests that there is more than one mystery to be solved in homicide
prosecution of juveniles. The added mystery is detecting the factor or
set of factors that render half the juveniles "adult," and the other half,
delinquent.
A prosecutorial strategy dealing with certification has yet to emerge
in the juvenile court literature. Most attempts at studying decision-
making in Family Courts have investigated variables accounting for the
decision to arrest,"I the distribution of juvenile court dispositions,12 and
the incidence of commitment to juvenile institutions. 13 These studies
yield an array of characteristics which appear to elicit harsh sanctions
throughout the juvenile court system: severity of offense, past criminal
history, race, age, crime against the person, and low socio-economic sta-
tus. These characteristics, however, are only marginally helpful in ac-
counting for the sorting process leading to certification because all
juveniles in the present sample were arrested for the same offense and 90
percent of the offenders were black.
Typically, prosecutorial decisions are based on several considera-
tions: situational aspects of the offense, offender characteristics, and pol-
icy implications. Regarding certification, this strategy aims at
identifying juveniles whose actions and past record reveal a maturity or
"seriousness" rendering the youth to be, in actuality, an "adult." Situa-
tional factors which may affect the seriousness of the killing include fel-
ony precipitation and the offender's role in the killing. The offender's
role referred to in this study as "degree of participation," is of particular
relevance to certification because juvenile offenses usually involve more
than one assailant. Is it only the principal assailant, the youth who in-
flicted the fatal wound, whom the court singles out as "most mature"
and thus most deserving of transfer? In addition to aspects of the of-
fense, characteristics of the individual offender will also likely contribute
to the decision to certify. Offender characteristics include the juvenile's
(1976); Voss & Hepburn, Pallers in Cn'ninal Homicide in Chicago, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 499
(1968).
i See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972).
12 Scarpitti & Stephenson,Juvenile Court Dispositions-Factors in the Decision-Making Process,
17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 143 (1971).
13 See, e.g., Arnold, Race and Ethnici Relative to Other Factors, 77 AM. J. Soc. 211 (1972).
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offense record and prior adjudication by the Family Court. Prior adju-
dications are likely to bear directly on the issue of "maturity" and "ame-
nability to treatment."
The final factor likely to affect prosecutorial strategy is more funda-
mental: It concerns how Family Court fits into the larger system of a
city-wide policy of criminal prosecution. Does Family Court function as
a separate, enclosed judicial forum with its own adjudication and pun-
ishment rationale, or does it serve to screen potential cases for eventual
trial in adult court and thereby insure successful conviction rates for the
prosecutor's office? This research was designed to address this question
precisely because the waiver process sits at the juncture of civil and
criminal jurisdictions.
Several of the offender and offense characteristics whose impor-
tance is suggested by the above discussion were isolated to discern their
impact on the decision to separate the juvenile sample into juvenile and
"adult" defendants. These four variables, or "risk factors" were
(1) Type of killing; felony or non-felony precipitated; 14
(2) Age of offender;
(3) Degree of participation in the offense (principal assailant or acces-
sory);
(4) Past juvenile record.
Bivariate crosstabulations revealed that all but one of these four
variables were significantly associated with certification (aC = .05). Be-
cause type of killing failed to distinguish between juveniles certified to
adult court and juveniles retained by Family Court, an additional varia-
ble, race of victim and offender, has been substituted in its place. 15 Ta-
14 Homicides in this sample were separated into felony and non-felony related killings by
using the police description of the offense. This dichotomy is a tool for the researcher: the
District Attorney's office does not designate by charge which killings grew out of an argument
and which were precipitated by a robbery or other felony. Although indictments for all kill-
ings were returned under the charge of Murder General, Pennsylvania's felony murder rule
clearly marks the felony killing for special handling in that premeditation--specific intent to
kill-is supplied by the initial felony. Because of this provision, jury trials of felony murder
return first degree convictions in almost 90 percent of the cases. In non-felony killings, juries
find premeditation in less than 30 percent of the trial. See, Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra
note 3, at 231.
15 Although these crosstabs did reveal significant associations between the variables age,
participation in the killing, and juvenile record, there was considerable within group varia-
tion in both juvenile samples. For example, although the certified group contained juveniles
with serious offense histories, who were nearing the age limit of Family Court jurisdiction,
and who had inflicted the fatal wound, it was also true that a number of juveniles sent to
criminal court did not inflict the wound, nor did they have a juvenile record, nor had they
reached their 17th birthday. Further, there were juveniles retained by juvenile court who had
extensive offense records, were 17 years old, and a minority of whom had inflicted the fatal
wound.
So far these data have been analyzed using bivariate tabular analysis and simple test
statistics (chi-square). Several multivariate techniques could be used to test for interaction
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ble 2 shows the certification risks associated with these four variables.
This distribution is in the form of an actuarial table and can be read in
the following manner: "of all juveniles with X or with X combination
of characteristics, what percent were certified?"
TABLE 2







0 Factors Present 12% 17
1 Factor Present 33 67
Criminal Record 29 42
Age 17 33 6
White Victim-Black Offender 38 8
Inflicted Wound 56 9
2 Factors Present 61 41
Criminal Record + Age 17 50 10
White Victim + Criminal Record 72 11
Criminal Record + Inflicted Wound 56 16
Inflicted Wound + Age 17 100 2
3 Factors Present 83 24
Criminal Record + Inflicted Wound + White 75 4
Victim
Criminal Record + Inflicted Wound + Age 17 82 17
Criminal Record + White Victim + Age 17 100 4
All 4 Factors Present 100 5
Total 49 154
Certification rates increase as the number of risk factors goes from
none (12 percent certified) to four (100 percent certified). Examining
the factors or combinations of factors individually, Table 2 reveals that
with the exception of "inflicted wound," the other three risk factors car-
effects and factor loadings. One recognizes, however, that the strength of any observed associ-
ation must be tempered with the size of the sample. Because of the obvious small size of the
two juvenile samples, regression analysis was considered to be too powerful a technique to use
with these data. An alternative method would be to state the relationship between risk fac-
tors and certification in the form of an actuarial table, i.e. Table 2.
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ried individual certification risks considerably lower than the overall
sample rate: 49 percent. A seventeen-year-old youth who took part in a
killing but did not inflict the fatal wound, did not cross racial lines, and
did not have a juvenile offense record faced certification risks of 33 per-
cent. The single factor which carried the most significance was the of-
fender's role in the killing, that he inflicted the fatal wound. Over half
the juveniles with only this one variable present were certified.
Overall, the array of risk factors shows that the two most potent
variables are race of victim and degree of participation in the offense.
These figures reveal the continuing impact of race on differential deci-
sion-making by the courts. When black youths kill whites, chances of
certification begin at 38 percent and jump to at least 72 percent when
any additional factor or factors are present.
The danger in presenting certification in such a schematic way is
that the decision to transfer jurisdiction appears to reflect a simple
formula; as variables are combined, the cumulative percentages "ex-
plain" the decision to certify. Although true that juveniles with three
and four risk factors faced transfer risks of 75 to 100 percent, this only
accounts for 27 of the 75 certified juveniles. The 43 remaining
juveniles-60 percent of the entire transfer group-were drawn from
risk categories which carried only a 50 percent risk of certification. This
is the group for which a formulaic approach to certification would have
difficulty predicting certification or retention by the juvenile court. And
this is precisely the group which illustrates the range of discretion open
to the prosecutor. Why were these juveniles transferred when other
juveniles with the same "risk factors" were kept in Family Court? To
answer this question, one turns to the third element of prosecutorial con-
cern: policy considerations. Additional determinants of certification are
now sought in a larger strategy of prosecuting homicide defendants
across juvenile and criminal jurisdictions.
IV. JUVENILE HOMICIDE OFFENDERS IN FAMILY COURT
Homicide investigation in Philadelphia receives special attention:
no other offense is the subject of such sustained investigatory and
prosecutorial interest. Homicides are prosecuted by a separate section of
the District Attorney's office. This level of scrutiny is maintained by the
prosecutor's office in Family Court as well.
Very few juveniles arrested in homicide events in Philadelphia es-
cape some form of formal processing by the Family Court. Of the 79
juveniles retained by Family Court, 68 eventually reached the adjudica-
tory hearing stage (comparable to the trial in criminal court). Figure 1




68 - present at adjudication hearings1
61 - adjudged delinquent
Committed to Institution Probation
30 28(49%)* (46%)
* The percentages total 95% because 3 juveniles received no dispositions.
FIGURE 1
PROGRESSION OF JUVENILE HOMICIDE OFFENDERS THROUGH
FAMILY COURT
Of those juveniles who reached the adjudicatory hearing stage, 90 per-
cent were adjudged delinquent. This rate fluctuates, depending upon
the presence of aggravating factors in the offense. The four risk factors
used to explain the variance in certification may also be employed as
determinants of adjudication and subsequent incarceration in a juvenile
facility. 16
Before assessing the impact of risk factors on juvenile court process-
ing, a word of caution is advised. This is not a "what-if' analysis, that
is,.what might have happened to the certified juvenile had he not been
transferred. This type of analysis is not possible for two reasons. First,
juveniles left behind in Family Court are a poor sample from which to
predict general confinement risks precisely because they were left be-
hind. Had they formed a close approximation to the characteristics of
the certified group, they would have been transferred. Second, compar-
ing confinement rates ofjuvenile and criminal jurisdictions is misleading
because the reasons for imprisonment very likely differ. A seventeen-
year-old youth in criminal court may receive a harsh sentence because
his presence in adult court in light of his age is taken to signify maturity.
A seventeen-year-old in juvenile court may receive a lenient sentence
because the court realizes it has only a few months to confine him.
These different punishment motives prevent an assessment of the certi-
fied juvenile's risks of incarceration had he been retained by juvenile
court.
16 J. P. Eigen, The Borderlands of Juvenile Justice: The Waiver Process in Philadelphia
159-65 (1977) (unpublished Ph.D thesis in The University of Pennsylvania Library).
1080 [Vol. 72
1981] YOUTH HOMICIDE OFFENDERS 1081
TABLE 3
COMMITMENT BY PRECIPITATING FACTORS, JUVENILES
RETAINED IN FAMILY COURT
COMBINATIONS OF FACTORS COMMITMENTS
Percent N
0 Factors Present 10% 10
1 Factor Present 52 31
Age 17 55 22
Criminal Record 100 1
White Victim-Black Offender 33 3
Inflicted Wound 40 5
2 Factors Present 67 18
Criminal Record + Age 17 33 3
White Victim + Criminal Record 50 4
Criminal Record + Inflicted Wound 80 10
Inflicted Wound + Age 17 100 1
All 3 Factors Present 50 2
Total 49 61
Table 3 gives the proportion of juveniles confined to juvenile insti-
tutions by single and multiple risk factors. In contrast to Table 2, these
data show little additive risk as the number of factors are increased.
The reason one fails to see an escalation of a punishment arc with these
juveniles is that youths with the "right" combination of risk factors were
removed from Family Court jurisdiction and transferred to criminal
couit. Juveniles left behind appear to be a varied assortment. Some
appear to be only "marginally delinquent" and are either dismissed
before the adjudicatory hearing or placed on probation following the
hearing. Others are in their late teens and probably would have been
candidates for certification had the evidence in their cases been strong
enough to stand the test of a criminal trial. The reticence on the part of
Family Court to incarcerate them at this late stage might reflect recogni-
tion of its limited amount of remaining jurisdiction as mentioned above.
The lack of any unified punishment response on the part of Family
Court as revealed by these data might also correspond to a strategy of
case "management" in which punishment decisions are made at initial
stages of screening. Asking "Are we eventually going to punish these
youth?" Family Court personnel dismiss some juveniles before the de-
tention hearing, adjudicate others and place them on probation. The
Court then turns to those youths whose delinquent history and present
offense mandate harsher treatment.
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V. JUVENILE HOMICIDE OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURT
Certification is clearly the most punishing decision available to
Family Court and the most momentous in the life of a juvenile offender.
In Family Court, the maximum sentence is incarceration until the youth
is 21; 17 in criminal court, the maximum sentence is death., Those left
behind in Family Court faced a 50 percent incarceration risk, but unlike
certification, a cumulative actuarial risk was not in evidence.
Juveniles transferred to criminal court are faced with a second sort-
ing procedure once they enter adult jurisdiction. This additional sorting
process suggests a strategy of prosecuting homicide defendants along
two tracks: one for felony related killings, and another for deaths which
resulted from altercations or gang related deaths. The difference in case
management is illustrated in the ratio ofjury trials to guilty pleas and in
the length of sentence imposed. This is true for both certified juvenile
and for adult defendants.
In Philadelphia non-felony killings receive less attention than fel-
ony killings from the District Attorney's office for several reasons. Non-
felony killings are likely to take place between members of the same
race, to be gang related, and to be precipitated by an argument. These
deaths often occur between people who know each other and appear to
be the unintended result of a street or barroom fight. None of these
factors lessens the fact that a purposeful killing took place, nor do the
above considerations preclude a finding of premeditation. In Penn-
sylvania, premeditation is supplied by "specific intent to kill," the pres-
ence of a deadly wound.' 9 Since at least three-quarters of these victims
died because of a gunshot or a knife wound, the inference of specific
intent to kill could have been made, regardless of the precipitating
event. Yet fewer than five percent of non-felony murder defendants
received first degree convictions, suggesting a prosecutorial strategy less
rigorous in its treatment of the killing arising out of an argument, often
between friends or acquaintances. 20
Felony related homicides present a different picture to the prosecu-
tor's office and are handled on more of a case by case basis. These kill-
ings are much more likely to take place between strangers and are often
interracial. Plea bargaining in felony related deaths is held to a mini-
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101 replaced by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon
1976).
18 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4701, 4702, 4919 (Purdon) replaced by 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1976).
19 Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966); Commonwealth v. Kirk-
land, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338 (1963); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 532, 194 A.2d
911, 915 (1963).
20 See Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, sufpra note 3, at 238-41.
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mum, jury trials appear to be the preferred forum from the prosecutor's
perspective. His decision to go to trial is no doubt tempered by the risk
of acquittal, but the prosecutor's strategy appears to favor taking this
risk rather than relying on an assured conviction and a shorter sentence
which would result from a guilty plea to a lesser offense.
The next series of tables compares charge on conviction and range
of sentences between felony and non-felony murder defendants, and
within these two groups, between juvenile and adult offenders. Table 4
gives data on the final charge. Thirty-six percent of the juvenile defend-
ants compared with forty-two percent of the adults were convicted of
first degree murder.
TABLE 4
FINAL VERDICT FOR CONVICTED FELONY MURDER SUSPECTS
FOR CERTIFIED JUVENILE AND ADULT DEFENDANTS
CERTIFIED
JUVENILES ADULTS
Final Verdict Percent Percent
First-degree murder 36% 42%
Second-degree murder 36 42




N = 22* 33
* Two juveniles were dismissed (nol prossed) before trial.
Both offender groups exhibit a surprising degree of variability in final
charge for felony murder convictions. Because premeditation, by Penn-
sylvania statute, is supplied by the initial felony,2' one might assume
that only in the rarest of circumstances would a finding of less-than-first
degree be rendered. The range in charge, however, comes as little sur-
prise to those familiar with the patterns in homicide sentencing. Rather
than mandate an automatic finding of premeditation, the felony murder
rule may actually increase the prosecutor's discretion. Because a guilty
verdict for first degree murder carries with it a mandatory minimum life
sentence, some defendants may be pressured into either pleading guilty
21 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4701, 4702, 4919 (Purdon) replaced by 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1976). Specific felonies mentioned in the statute include robbery, rape,
deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping.
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to lesser offenses (voluntary manslaughter, robbery) or waiving their
rights to a jury trial. This decrease in the number of defendants permits
the prosecutor to concentrate on the few cases he can steer into a jury
trial where first degree convictions are likely.22
Compared with adult defendants, certified juveniles were only
slightly less likely to receive convictions of first or second degree murder.
Table 5 reveals that this difference in final charge is partially reflected in
minimum sentence. Regardless of their reduced charge on conviction
relative to adults, juveniles enjoy relatively little leniency with regard to
sentence. And with the exception of two juvenile defendants screened
out by the grand jury, all juveniles tried in criminal court for felony
killings were convicted and sentenced to prison with a median minimum
sentence length of three-to-five years. The fact that no juvenile received
probation further underscores the impact of waiver for juveniles arrested
in felony murder.
TABLE 5
MINIMUM SENTENCE FOR CONVICTED FELONY MURDER








1-2 years 23 27
3-5 years 55 42
6-8 years 64 51
9-12 years 64 54
Life Imprisonment 100 94
Death Penalty 100 100
N = 22 33
As previously mentioned, non-felony killings are prosecuted less
rigorously, more with an interest in obtaining a conviction than in im-
posing a long sentence. Both juvenile and adult defendants tried for
non-felony killing find it easier to plead guilty to a lesser charge or stand
bench trial than suspects indicted in felony-related killing. More than
22 See Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 3.
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half of these killings were disposed of through guilty pleas; less than one-
third of the felony killing defendants were able to negotiate a plea.
Juveniles face a conviction rate of 88 percent for non-felony killings
compared with the adult defendants' rate of 75 percent. How can one
explain the higher proportion? A recent study of criminal prosecution
in Los Angeles reveals that the screening of felony cases produces low
dismissal rates, above average rates of guilty pleas and higher overall
conviction percentages. 23 Similarly, the 75 percent conviction rate for
adult defendants in non-felony killings in Philadelphia suggests careful
prosecutorial case selection. That the juveniles' rate is even higher leads
one to suspect even more efficient screening suggesting a degree of
"quality control" in the juvenile court's decision to transfer. This mat-
ter will be addressed in the discussion section.
TABLE 6
FINAL VERDICT FOR CONVICTED NON-FELONY MURDER






First-degree murder 7% 3%
Second-degree murder 58 35
Voluntary manslaughter 24 48
Other felony or misdemeanor
of involuntary manslaughter 11 14
100% 100%
N 45* 106
* Two juveniles were dismissed (nol-prossed) before trial, and four were acquitted.
Table 6 presents data on final charge on conviction for juveniles
and adults tried for non-felony killings. In contrast to felony murder
data, juveniles were convicted of higher degrees of murder than adults
for similar types of killing. Of those juveniles convicted in non-felony
killing, 65 percent were convicted of either first or second degree mur-
der, compared with 38 percent of the adult defendants.
23 p. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. Pocio, M. STRUMWASSER & P. DE LEON, PROSE-





MINIMUM SENTENCE FOR CONVICTED NON-FELONY MURDER








1-2 years 60 78
3-5 years 88 92
6-8 years 93 96
9-12 years 93 98
Life Imprisonment 98 101
Death Penalty 100 101
N = 43* 104*
* Two juveniles and two adults were not sentenced.
These higher degrees of conviction for juveniles translate into more
severe sentences as well. Table 7 shows that among non-felony murder
suspects, juveniles received fewer probationary sentences and longer
prison terms than adults. Juveniles also received proportionately more
life sentences and a juvenile was given the only death sentence for a non-
felony killing in either sample.
Although approximately half of each group received sentences in
the one-to-two year range, juveniles received fewer probationary
sentences relative to adults. Consequently, 40 percent of the younger
offenders faced prison terms in excess of two years, compared with 23
percent of the adults.
Disparate sentences invite a consideration of the legal and extra-
legal factors that tend to influence length of sentence. Although charge
on conviction is likely to be the most salient factor in prescribing sen-
tence length, in felony related killings, the juveniles' reduced charge on
conviction relative to adults translated only marginally into reduced
sentences: 45 percent of the juveniles and 58 percent of the adult de-
fendants received sentences of at least six years in prison.
One factor likely to affect sanctions is previous criminal (or juve-
nile) record. When severity of punishment is cross-tabulated with
number of previous adjudications of delinquency, the most noticeable
effect is in the category of probation. Probationary sentences are more
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likely to be given to juveniles with no prior record. However, 19 of the
24 juveniles with no record received prison sentences, and one received
life. And the four life and death sentences went to juveniles with the
least serious history of delinquency involvement. 24 A similar pattern
emerges in adult sentences. Probationary sentences most often go to first
offenders, but a majority of adults with no previous record of convictions
still received prison sentences and one received life. For both sets of
offenders, it appears that although previous record may influence the
decision to grant probation for a few defendants, there is no direct linear
relationship between previous delinquent or criminal involvement and
length of sentence.
There is a strong possibility that the difference one sees in charge
and sentence between the juvenile and adult populations is due to the
race of victim. Only one interracial killing was reported in the adult
non-felony murder population; the offender had no record and received
probation. Six black juveniles, however, crossed racial lines and these
killings resulted in one life and one death sentence. Both of these offend-
ers had a record of one previous adjudication. The four remaining
juveniles in these interracial killings received prison sentences.
Race of victim also appears to temper the effect of the degree of
offender participation on sentencing. Juveniles who did not inflict the
fatal wound were more than twice as likely to receive probation than
were their co-offenders who were the principal assailants. But race of
victim diminishes the significance of the offender's actual role in the kill-
ing. When blacks cross racial lines the principle of accessorial liability is
in force. In interracial killings, principal assailants and their co-offend-
ers are sentenced to prison terms of comparable length. No comparable
data on the participation variable for adult offenders exists because such
offenses were more likely to be single-offender slayings.
The salient factor in increased sentence severity for juveniles is thus
the more frequent choice of a white victim. Interracial offenses by
blacks elicit harsh sanctions throughout the juvenile and criminal justice
systems. Although race is a possible explanation for the disparity in sen-
tencing, one would need to construct a sample to include a higher inci-
dence of adult non-felony interracial killings before a more convincing
statement of association can be made. Prospects for securing such a
sample are not promising given the current state of relations between
the races with regard to acquaintance, friendship, and marital choice.
Consequently, black-white killings are much more likely to be precipi-
tated by a felony than by an argument between drinking partners or
lovers.
24 See J.P. Eigen, supra note 16.
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Another reason for the difference between juvenile and adult
sentences is that one is observing a highly screened sample of juvenile
defendants. It comes as little surprise that juvenile conviction rates and
sentence length surpass those of the adult defendants; their offenses have
been screened for evidentiary rigor. Pursuant to Pennsylvania law a
prima facie case must be established as a precondition for waiver.2 5 The
fact that few if any juveniles were nolprossed by the grand jury suggests
that there has been a very careful selection of juvenile homicide defend-
ants for criminal court. Were adult cases similarly screened, one would
expect adult defendants to face conviction rates more in line with the
juveniles' experience.
An earlier study of sentencing determinants in the prosecution of
homicide in Philadelphia paid particular attention to the effect of racial
configuration of victim and offender on the two most severe sentences,
life and death.2 6 Table 8 cross-tabulates race of victim and offender
with severity of punishment for black juveniles.
TABLE 8
PUNISHMENT BY RACE OF VICTIM FOR BLACK CERTIFIED
JUVENILES
White Victim Black Victim
Felony Killings
Life or Death 8 0
Other Sentence 4 9
Fisher's Exact Test sig. .002
Non-Felony Killing
Life or Death 2 1
Other Sentence 5 32
Fisher's Exact Test sig. .07
In felony killings, black offenders who crossed racial lines received a
sentence of life or death significantly more often than offenders whose
victims were black. In non-felony killings, the difference does not attain
statistical significance although it approaches the criterion of .05. Like
adults, juvenile homicide offenders are not likely to cross racial lines in
non-felony killings. When they do, their choice of a white victim is
likely to elicit the harshest sanctions available to the court.
These data bring into sharp relief the significance of the certifica-
25 In re Gaskins, 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662 (1968).
26 See Zirring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 3.
1088 [Vol. 72
YOUTH HOMICIDE OFFENDERS
tion decision. Almost 90 percent of the juveniles tried in criminal court
were sentenced to prison, but less than half of the juveniles tried in juve-
nile court were incarcerated. Three-quarters of the certified juveniles
would remain in prison when the last non-waived juvenile was released.
Ten certified juveniles were sentenced to life, one to death. This sharp
contrast in sanction between two juvenile groups sharing a considerable
overlap in offense and offender characteristics raises several questions.
To what extent can one speak of certification as a principled decision,
and what is the prosecutor's role in the offense and offender selection
process known as case management?
VI. DISCUSSION
To characterize juvenile court as the victim of its own mixed mo-
tives has become commonplace. Juveniles are to be "saved," juvenile
crime is to be suppressed. At some point, these motives cross and the
retributive function of the juvenile court manifests itself in the decision
to seek certification. This research was designed to study how this deci-
sion is reached, and what consequences accrue from this jurisdictional
transfer. Against the background of these data, three closely related
themes are brought into sharp relief: the role of the prosecutor in seek-
ing certification, the discontinuity of sentencing based on any system of
age-determinate cut-offs, and the desirability of coordinating the sen-
tencing policies of juvenile and criminal jurisdictions.
Prominently missing in the juvenile justice literature is any discus-
sion of the prosecutor's role in the selection of juvenile offenders for
criminal court. Instead, the reader learns of the court's attempt to assess
"dangerousness" and "amenability.127 Doubtless, these are important
considerations and carry much weight in the eventual decision. But at
the same time juveniles in criminal court are in for a rough experience.
With conviction rates of 100 percent and 92 percent for felony murder
and non-felony murder respectively, one suspects that more variables
are involved in the selection process.
Prosecutors in juvenile court work for a unified District Attorney's
office in a way that is not true for the juvenile court judge. True, the
judiciary is not completely autonomous in Family Court, but one does
not see the continuity (and accountability) of functioning that is appar-
ent when the successful prosecution of juvenile cases in adult court is
27 A 1962 study of fifty-two juvenile court judges revealed that the criteria that shaped
their decisions to waive jurisdictions were the following: (1) issues of contestable fact which
would prolong a juvenile hearing; (2) a serious offense occurring after previous correctional
treatment; (3) "the case is hopeless"; (4) the child needs to be punished because of his atti-
tude; and (5) that the advantages of safety and treatment lie within the criminal court sys-
tem. Transfer of Cases BtweaenJuenile and Criminal Court, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENcY 5 (1962).
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made known. There are no objective reasons why it should be easier to
convict a "mature" youth than a "mature" adult, but there are obvious
benefits to screening the juvenile's case when it first comes to juvenile
court. However this is done (and with the new Juvenile Court Act the
sorting is done first by the adult court),28 these cases have been screened
for evidentiary rigor. Weak cases are left in juvenile court where the
offender faces a 50-50 risk of incarceration; stronger cases are transferred
to criminal court where evidentiary rigor yields high conviction rates
and substantial prison terms.
Traditionally, the prosecutor enjoys broad discretionary judgment
in selecting cases for trial and in the manner of prosecution he chooses to
pursue. His presence in adult court is obvious; his influence in juvenile
court has been largely ignored. These data reveal a strategy of selecting
juveniles for transfer which eventually yields high conviction rates and
sentences as long as those received by adult defendants, and often
longer. This obvious coordination of effort between the prosecutor's of-
fice in juvenile court and the District Attorney's office in criminal court
attests to the role of the prosecutor as the one critical link between the
two jurisdictions.
To write that screening was in evidence is not to argue that
"prosecutorial worth" was the sole consideration mandating the decision
to seek certification. Most of the transferred juveniles presented offense
and offender characteristics which likely aggravated the immediate of-
fense rendering the perpetrators probable candidates for certification.
Once tried and convicted, these same factors all but ruled out proba-
tionary sentences bringing instead full adult sanctions. But a majority
of the certified juveniles shared a considerable number of "risk factors"
with the non-waived sample which revealed substantial overlap between
the two juvenile groups. Given the enormous difference in sentencing
power between juvenile and criminal court, one is compelled to look for
the principles which guide the court in considering the waiver option.
Certification has traditionally been justified along the lines of ame-
nability: the youth's capacity to respond to the rehabilitative resources
of the juvenile court. Because the original mandate for the juvenile
court was to assess "condition," it seemed fitting that youths who were
really adults by virtue of seriousness of their crime or past criminal in-
volvement were to be excluded from the court's benevolent, child saving
jurisdiction. But how does one measure "condition"? A possible factor
could be the youth's history of delinquency and previous attempts at
correction. Having already passed through the juvenile justice system




with its full array of rehabilitative resources, the youth failed to respond
and thus presents himself as a poor "condition risk." But how much
previous contact is "too much"? If this is the standard which guides
certification, one finds it disquieting that there exist so few guidelines to
assist the court in determining when a youth is "beyond redemption."
This apparent failure to respond to the juvenile court's helping
hand may constitute an additional aggravating factor: "contempt ofju-
venile court." Not only would this serve as a justifiable reason for trans-
fer, it may also help to explain the disparity in sentencing between
juvenile and adult offenders tried for non-felony murder. As a reason
for the initial transfer, non-amenability may make some intuitive sense,
but why are the consequences so great? Is the presence of past delin-
quent involvement sufficiently serious to justify the quantum leap in
punishment that follows on conviction? If the decision to certify is de-
fended on these grounds the court is saying in effect that past failure to
reform can be worth up to 10 years additional imprisonment in the
adult system.
The following graph shows the discontinuity in sentencing policy
with juvenile offenders arrested for homicide but tried in different juris-
dictions.
FIGURE 2








When the disparities in sentences are revealed, one is compelled to
ask: "To what extent could one have designed such a system?" Is this
one system of prosecution or two, which happen to interface in a highly
accidental way because the two systems meet at the point of waiver, but
fail to follow through with a unified sanctioning policy? Again, it is the
interface of the two systems at the point of waiver that is problematic. It
would not be difficult to defend either the juvenile justice or the crimi-
nal justice system in terms of the range in punishment given relative to
that jurisdiction's sanctioning philosophy. But justifying both systems'
dispositions, while operating within identical offense categories, takes
considerable explanation. Part of the explanation can be sought in the
extraordinary range of discretion in this selection process. Although a
high percentage of certified juveniles were seventeen, the actuarial risk
for seventeen-year-olds was the lowest of the four "dangerousness vari-
ables." The minimal risk associated with age per se is due to the two
systems working on two different theories.
Assuming that a theory of diminished responsibility animates the
juvenile court, the shift in sentencing policy appears to be too abrupt.
In the position of doing "all or nothing at all," juvenile court's disposi-
tions display a heavy reliance on probation and minimal use of confine-
ment or certification. When these dispositions are compared with
sentences received by certified juveniles in adult court, it is clear that the
manner in which the prosecutorial system now functions fails to coordi-
nate any rational sentencing policy between the two jurisdictions. It is
also apparent that the arbitrariness of any age cut-off will be under-
scored by a policy which appears to make a substantial investment in its
youthful offenders, but later ceases all attention once the juvenile
reaches majority. As argued in the report of the Twentieth Century
Fund's Confronting Youth Crime, the reasons for a doctrine of diminished
responsibility based on youth and life experience do not vanish with the
youth reaching age 18.29 Why, then, should they vanish after certifica-
tion?
As the certification process now operates, age takes on dramatic sig-
nificance when the two systems meet at the point of waiver and the low
incidence of waiver only serves to underscore the shock in sentence se-
verity. If a youth manages to reach his eighteenth birthday without be-
ing transferred, he enters the adult court as a first offender, that is, his
juvenile record disappears and though he is now fully accountable for
his actions, he actually enjoys an extension of the doctrine of diminished
responsibility because of his youth. Young adults in criminal court con-
tinue to receive light sentences, perhaps due to the court's incomplete
29 F. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME (1978).
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knowledge about prior criminal record.30
As the peak age of violent crime arrest continues to drop to the late-
to-mid teens, one hears enthusiastic support for lowering the jurisdic-
tional age of juvenile court to sixteen and younger. This would, in es-
sence, constitute "wholesale certification" and would obviously flood the
criminal courts already plagued with substantial case backlog. One
wonders if this would resolve the question of a unified sentencing policy;
should all defendants, regardless of age, be liable for the same sanctions?
What would happen if the peak age drops to fifteen; will there be a
suggestion to lower jurisdiction again? As revealed by these data, any
form of age-determinate prosecution is likely to produce gross disparities
in punishment in an all-or-nothing interface between juvenile and crim-
inal jurisdictions.
30 See J.P. Eigen, sufra note 16; Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 3.
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